Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality | manwithoutqualities

Posted: April 3, 2012 in cognition/consciousness, Ideas

Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality

Shaun Gallagher talk:

I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore the connections between this concept and recent embodied approaches to social cognition.

via Shaun Gallagher: Enactively extended intentionality | manwithoutqualities.

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